Does Warrantless Wiretapping Violate Moral Rights? by Lee, Evan Tsen
San Diego Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 4
11-1-2007
Does Warrantless Wiretapping Violate Moral
Rights?
Evan Tsen Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Internet Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San
Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evan T. Lee, Does Warrantless Wiretapping Violate Moral Rights?, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 723 (2007).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol44/iss4/4




Does Warrantless Wiretapping Violate 
Moral Rights? 
EVAN TSEN LEE* 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 5, 2007, President Bush signed legislation that put an end 
to the immediate legal controversy over the National Security Agency’s 
warrantless wiretapping program.1  The new legislation undoubtedly 
makes the wiretapping program legal.2  But the controversy over warrantless 
wiretapping will undoubtedly flare up again, for the legislation is 
temporary—it sunsets in February 2008.3  Congress will eventually have 
to confront the question whether its temporary legislation is worthy of 
being made more permanent, even if not until after the 2008 presidential 
election.  In making this decision, Congress should certainly consider, 
among other things, the morality of warrantless wiretapping.  Does warrantless 
wiretapping ever violate people’s moral rights, and, if so, under what 
circumstances?  In this paper, I attempt to answer these questions 
through the following two-pronged thesis: First, it is not immoral for 
government to wiretap innocent persons without warrants, provided that 
the operatives reasonably believe that such surveillance is necessary to 
 * Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  
Thanks to Larry Alexander, David Brink, and Daniel Solove for helpful criticisms and 
suggestions. 
 1. James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2007, at A1. 
 2. See id. (“‘This more or less legalizes the N.S.A. program,’ said Kate Martin, 
director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, who has studied the 
new legislation.”). 
 3. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 6(c), 121 Stat. 552 (2007). 




save innocent human life; second, government does not act immorally in 
wiretapping known terrorists without warrants, so long as operatives 
reasonably believe the subjects are terrorists, and so long as the surveillance 
is reasonably related to saving lives. 
In defending this thesis, I will make several subsidiary arguments: 
1. Wiretapping without adequate justification generally violates  
 moral rights because it denigrates the full personhood of the  
 subject. 
2. Wiretapping innocent people is justifiable if necessary to save  
 innocent human life. 
3. A reasonable belief in necessity is the moral equivalent of actual  
 necessity. 
4. There are lesser moral strictures on wiretapping known terrorists  
 than on wiretapping innocent persons because of a partial  
 forfeiture of moral rights. 
I. 
Edward J. Bloustein, a professional philosopher and law professor, is 
credited with developing the argument that privacy rights are worth 
defending because they “protect[] against intrusions demeaning to 
personality and against affronts to human dignity.”4  In a 1964 article in 
the New York University Law Review, Bloustein criticized William 
Prosser’s famous taxonomy of four distinct types of torts falling under 
the general umbrella of the right to privacy.5  According to Prosser, the 
four torts were:  
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private  
 affairs[;] 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff[;] 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye[; and] 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.6 
Prosser thought that these distinct torts protected different interests.  In 
the intrusion cases, the interest being protected was “freedom from mental 
distress[;] in the public disclosure and ‘false light’ cases, [it was] the 
interest in reputation[;] and in the appropriation cases, [it was one’s] 
proprietary interest in name and likeness.”7 
 4. See Judith DeCew, Privacy, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., Fall 2006 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/privacy/. 
 5. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964 (1964). 
 6. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 7. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 965. 
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The crux of Bloustein’s critique was that Prosser’s reductionist 
account of privacy was unfaithful to the view of privacy pioneered by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their famous article The Right to 
Privacy.8  Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy was a value independent 
from all others—it was simply the “right . . . to be let alone.”9  Although 
Warren and Brandeis did not attempt an exhaustive description of the 
interest underlying this right,10 they did contrast it with the “material” 
injury done to the victim of defamation.11  As Bloustein describes it, Warren 
and Brandeis’s notion of the invasion of privacy instead “involve[d] a 
‘spiritual’ wrong, an injury to a man’s ‘estimate of himself’ and an assault 
upon ‘his own feelings.’”12  For Warren and Brandeis, the underlying 
principle was one of “inviolate personality.”13 
Bloustein put his own gloss on Warren and Brandeis’s formulation: “I 
take the principle of ‘inviolate personality’ to posit the individual’s 
independence, dignity and integrity; it defines man’s essence as a unique 
and self-determining being.”14  Then, surveying the intrusion cases—for 
he was attempting to refute Prosser point by point—Bloustein made the 
assertion most relevant to our immediate inquiry: 
I contend that the gist of the wrong in the intrusion cases is not the intentional 
infliction of mental distress but rather a blow to human dignity, an assault on 
human personality.  Eavesdropping and wiretapping, unwanted entry into another’s 
home, may be the occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment but that is 
not what makes these acts of intrusion wrongful.  They are wrongful because 
they are demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they cause 
emotional trauma.15 
Whether Bloustein was right that the tort of privacy is a unitary concept, 
or whether Prosser was right that it was four distinct torts, I believe that 
Bloustein’s characterization of an “assault on human dignity and personality” 
at the very least captured the essence of the intrusive variety of the 
invasion of privacy, which includes wiretapping.  To treat a person’s 
telephone conversations as open to unannounced government inspection 
 8. See id. at 971.  See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 9. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 205. 
 10. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 970. 
 11. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 197. 
 12. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 968. 
 13. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 205. 
 14. Bloustein, supra note 5, at 971. 
 15. Id. at 974. 




is to treat them as a public commodity.  Wiretapping in general fails to 
acknowledge that critical boundary between the individual and society.  
This is not to say that there is no overlap of interests between individuals 
and society;16 it is not even to say that there is no overlap of constitutive 
identity between individuals and society.17  It is merely to insist that in 
critical moral respects individuals do stand apart from the society 
they comprise, and that those boundaries deserve the utmost respect 
of democratic government. 
Moreover, the constant awareness that government may be tapping 
one’s phone inexorably leads to greater conformity—not only to the law, 
but to social and political orthodoxies.  This may be more of an instrumental 
argument than a moral one, but it certainly has moral consequences.  A 
government that even indirectly coerces conformity to officially approved 
norms and ideologies on social and political controversies otherwise 
open to honest debate is unlikely to be a moral government.  When a 
government comes to regard its citizens’ individuality more as an 
inconvenience to be avoided than as a good to be protected, it has lost its 
moral direction.18 
II. 
The previous part speaks only of wiretapping in general, characterizing it 
as immoral because of its assault on dignity and personhood.  This does 
not take into account the contingency of moral justification—the possibility 
that in any given instance government has an adequate reason or reasons 
to engage in wiretapping, even of the warrantless variety.  In this part I 
will argue that wiretapping innocent people, even without a warrant, is 
justifiable if necessary to save innocent human life, but not otherwise. 
As I have just said, wiretapping generally is immoral because it denigrates 
personhood.  But there are many acts that can be said to denigrate 
personhood, and not all of them have the same gravity.  To deliberately 
look past someone at a cocktail party may denigrate one’s personhood, 
but certainly not to the same extent as does torturing, raping, and murdering.  
Given my position that wiretapping generally assaults personhood, the 
viability of my argument that warrantless wiretapping is nonetheless 
justified if necessary to save innocent human life depends on my ability 
 16. Cf. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE COMMON GOOD 96 (2004) (stating that individual and 
public interests in public safety are not mutually exclusive). 
 17. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 
(2d ed. 1998) (suggesting that society is constitutive of individual identity). 
 18. I do not mean to embroil myself in the debate about whether all societies must 
regard human individuality as a good.  If it helps, I will limit the claim to all Western 
democracies. 
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to show that wiretapping is a considerably less grave moral harm than 
the killing of innocent people. 
To make this argument, I propose to borrow analytical apparatus and 
terminology from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s book, The Realm of Rights.19  
In the chapter on “Tradeoffs,” Thomson discusses the possibility that the 
disregard of rights may sometimes be morally justified.20  She operates 
from the premise that not all rights are absolute, and so do I.  As Thomson 
puts it, puzzling over the famous rights theories of Ronald Dworkin21 
and Robert Nozick:22 “I cannot believe they think it impermissible to 
kick a man in the shin to save four lives. . . .  But they are alas not very 
generous with detail.”23  The task, then, is to flesh out an analytical 
apparatus with sufficient detail to resolve the question of whether and 
when it is justifiable to engage in warrantless wiretapping.  Thomson’s 
refined version of the “Tradeoff Idea” is as follows: 
[I]t is . . . permissible for Y to infringe the claim [of X] if and only if Y would 
thereby produce a sufficiently large and appropriately distributed increment of 
good, or advantage, the size of the required increment, and the appropriateness 
of its distribution, turning entirely on the stringency of the claim.24 
Let us first attend to Thomson’s terminology.  When she refers to X’s 
claim, she means a putative right belonging to X and running against Y.  
When she refers to infringement, she means an action in contravention of 
a claimed right that is supported by adequate justification, as opposed to 
the violation of a right, which is a right-contravening action unsupported 
by adequate justification.  When she refers to an appropriately distributed 
increment of good, she means that the resulting good is not spread out so 
thinly that it creates only a tiny benefit for a huge number of people, but 
rather is sufficiently concentrated in at least one person that it makes a 
morally significant difference to his or her life.  When she refers to 
advantage, she means a possibility of good where the target good is not 
certain to result from the contemplated infringing action, but its chances 
of occurring are at least enhanced by it.  Finally, when she refers to the 
 19. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). 
 20. Id. at 153. 
 21. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 22. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 23. THOMSON, supra note 19, at 153–54 n.2. 
 24. Id. at 175.  One commentator refers to this as Thomson’s “Revised Tradeoff 
Idea.”  See Barbara Baum Levenbook, Defender of the Realm: Thomson on Rights, 11 
LAW & PHIL. 449, 449 (1992) (reviewing THOMSON, supra note 19). 




stringency of a claim, she means its weight—that is, the degree to which 
it resists being overcome by justification. 
We can now make a first attempt to plug in the specifics of the 
wiretapping controversy where variables appear in the Tradeoff Idea: It 
is permissible for law enforcement to engage in warrantless wiretapping 
if and only if such wiretapping would produce a sufficiently large and 
appropriately distributed increment of good or advantage, the size of the 
required increment, and the appropriateness of its distribution, turning 
entirely on the stringency of individuals’ claims not to be wiretapped. 
This formulation obviously begs the question of whether warrantless 
wiretapping would actually produce enough and appropriate “good” or 
“advantage” to overcome the claim not to be wiretapped.  To be sure, 
whenever law enforcement engages in wiretapping, there is a chance that 
it will turn up both past and contemplated crimes.  People who think 
their phone conversations are confidential will often admit to having 
cheated on their taxes, having exceeded the speed limit on the highway, 
having partaken of recreational drugs, or having made plans to do these 
things in the future.  I am going to ignore these incidental advantages of 
wiretapping because no one really believes that law enforcement ought 
to be routinely monitoring the calls of all Americans to keep them in line 
with the law.  Instead, the Bush Administration, to support its warrantless 
wiretapping program, has argued that the program saves innocent 
lives—that it has already prevented terrorist attacks, and that it will 
continue to do so in the future.25  So the real question is whether saving 
innocent lives is a sufficiently large and appropriately distributed good 
to overcome the claim not to be wiretapped without warrants. 
There is, of course, an important gap between wiretapping and saving 
human life.  Listening in on phone conversations never has the physical 
effect of stopping bullets or disabling bombs.  Our hope is that the 
information coming out of such surveillance will arm law enforcement 
with a critical tool to uncover and track down terrorist plots before they 
are executed, or to at least minimize the number of lives lost.  The point 
is that there is not a one-for-one correspondence between wiretapping 
and saving life; rather, wiretapping enhances the chances that law 
enforcement will prevent or minimize the loss of life to terrorist attacks. 
In Thomson’s terminology, then, the saving of innocent human lives 
cannot be counted as a “good” but only as an “advantage.”  Wiretapping 
makes the saving of innocent human lives more probable than no 
 25. See, e.g., Bush Says He Authorized Use of Wiretaps Because It Saves Lives, 
JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/358860; Spies, Lies 
and Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 15 (“Vice President Dick Cheney claimed it 
saved thousands of lives by preventing attacks.”). 
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wiretapping, but it is never absolutely certain to save lives.  Now if in a 
particular case it seems very likely that lives will be saved by warrantless 
wiretapping, and it turns out that the wiretapping does not actually save 
any lives, it would be wrongheaded to say that whatever enhancement of 
the probabilities of saving life were brought about by the wiretapping 
should not count in the justificatory calculus.  As Thomson says: “Suppose 
that if I kick A, I will thereby very probably save B’s life.  So I do kick 
A.  As things turn out, B dies anyway.  Was it all the same permissible 
for me to proceed?  I think we want to say yes.”26  Thus, it will simply 
not do to say that wiretapping can never be justified on the basis of 
saving lives because it is never certain that it will save lives.  It will have 
to depend on how much the wiretapping will enhance the probability 
that life will be saved. 
Suppose the FBI has just discovered there is a plot to detonate a “dirty 
bomb” somewhere in downtown Manhattan within the next six hours.  
There is no time to evacuate the city.  Without wiretapping, the FBI thinks it 
has about a 20% chance of stopping the terrorists.  With wiretapping, the 
FBI thinks it has about an 80% chance of stopping them.  Clearly, the 
wiretapping sufficiently enhances the probability of saving lives to justify 
the surveillance. 
Of course, this is not the precise question at issue.  The precise 
question is how much dispensing with a warrant enhances the probabilities 
of saving lives.  In other words, what are the probabilities of saving lives 
if a warrant is sought compared to the probabilities of saving lives if law 
enforcement proceeds without a warrant?  One would think that in most 
cases dispensing with the warrant requirement would only increase the 
chances of saving lives marginally, if at all.  But suppose in a particular 
case dispensing with the warrant requirement would increase the chances of 
saving lives from 20% to 80%.  Is this not, in Thomson’s terms, a 
permissible trade-off? 
I think it is, although the analysis is even more complicated than that.  
This is because in the warrantless wiretapping situation, there is not only 
one countervailing claim of right, but two—the subject’s right not to be 
wiretapped and the subject’s right not to be wiretapped without a 
warrant.  The first right, as Bloustein said, protects against the denigration 
of dignity and personality.27  The second right also protects against such 
 26. THOMSON, supra note 19, at 170. 
 27. See Bloustein, supra note 5, at 971. 
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denigration, but may also preserve a feeling of security and order quite 
apart from dignity and personhood.  Thus, the aggregate stringency of 
the subject’s claims is greater in the warrantless wiretapping situation 
than in the situation where a warrant is obtained.  Still, the aggregate 
stringency of those claims seems dwarfed by the massive increase (20% 
to 80%) in the chances of saving lives. 
There is still another complication, which I shall refer to as marginal 
distortion.  Let us stipulate that an increase in the probability of saving 
lives from 45% to 50% would not justify warrantless wiretapping.  I am 
not saying that everyone would agree with this statement—some people 
almost certainly would disagree with it—but many people would agree.  
Now let us suppose that the increase in probability is from 0% to 5%.  I 
would submit that some people who would not think an increase from 
45% to 50% justified would nevertheless find an increase from 0% to 
5% justified.  The increase remains only 5%, but morally the situation 
seems quite different.  If we permit the warrantless wiretapping, we 
would then have a fighting chance to save these innocent lives, as it 
were.  Not to permit the warrantless wiretapping would seem like the 
final act of doom for these innocents, akin perhaps to “throwing the 
switch” on an innocent person in the electric chair.  Thus, the absolute 
increase in probability—5%—seems to become distorted when we move 
it to the bottom margin of the probability scale. 
An analogous phenomenon occurs at the top margin of the scale.  If 
we posit an increase from 95% to 100%, many who would not find the 
warrantless wiretapping justified to obtain an increase from 45% to 50% 
will now find it justified.  In the 95% to 100% percent hypo, if we do not 
permit the warrantless wiretapping and somehow lives are lost, many 
would feel as if we had “their blood on our hands.”  We had an 
opportunity to guarantee that these innocent people would be spared, but 
we turned our backs on them.  If we refuse warrantless wiretapping that 
would have increased the chances from 45% to 50%, and lives are lost, 
there may be more of a tendency to sigh heavily and blame it on the 
unfairness of the universe.  It could easily have turned out well for 
everyone, after all. 
One might object that my marginal distortion phenomenon is an 
illusion, since in the real world the probability that human lives will be 
saved is never actually 0% or 100%.  In any real world scenario there is 
always at least a slim chance that lives will be lost or that lives will be 
saved.  But the marginal distortion phenomenon does not require actual 
certainties to operate.  If human minds tend to assimilate a particular 
probability to “virtual certainty,” the phenomenon will occur just the 
same.  All one has to do is to change the numbers in my hypotheticals 
such that the posited increase in the first marginal case is from 0.1% to 
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5.1% and in the second marginal case from 94.9% to 99.9%.  The 
distortion phenomenon might not be quite as strong in these new 
hypotheticals as in the originals, but it still exists.28 
All of this goes to the question of what constitutes sufficient enhancement 
of the probability of saving human life.  Note, however, that my thesis 
does not speak of whether warrantless wiretapping would “sufficiently 
enhance” the probability of saving human life; it speaks of whether such 
surveillance would be “necessary” to save life.  What is the relationship 
between these two standards? 
I intend the relationship between them to be logically circular yet 
heuristically reinforcing.  As I will explain, my definition of when it is 
necessary to resort to warrantless wiretapping to save lives is whenever 
such surveillance would sufficiently enhance the probability of saving 
such lives, and my definition of when such surveillance would sufficiently 
enhance the chances of saving lives is whenever it is necessary to save 
lives.  Logically, of course, this gets us nowhere.  Paradoxically, however, 
the posited equation of these verbal formulations may help us organize 
our moral intuitions in a way that moves the ball forward. 
A fuller explanation is in order.  Under Thomson’s Tradeoff Idea, 
warrantless wiretapping is justified if it sufficiently enhances the 
probability of saving human life.  Because Thomson does not—and, in 
my view, cannot—specify precisely how much enhancement is “sufficient,” 
one can argue that even the slightest enhancement is sufficient.  After 
all, the argument would run, we are talking about the ultimate valuable, 
human life.  Under Bloustein’s analysis, however, this argument is clearly 
mistaken.  The claim of a right not to be wiretapped has considerable 
stringency, as it is based on the protection of one’s dignity and 
personhood.  A slight enhancement of the chances of saving life cannot 
justify the disregard of such a claim.  So we need to incorporate into the 
test some reminder of the intense stringency of the claim against 
wiretapping. 
I propose using the term necessary because it gives the illusion of a 
bright line.  In everyday life, we commonly speak of things as being 
necessary to the achievement of other things, and we tend to think of it 
as a binary proposition.  Either A is necessary to the achievement of B, 
 28. I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that a 0% to 5% or 95% to 100% 
increase in the probabilities of saving life is always (or ever) sufficient to justify 
warrantless wiretapping.  Reasonable people will disagree.  I use these hypotheticals 
merely to point out the distortion phenomenon. 
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or A is unnecessary to the achievement of B.  Take the starting of one’s 
car.  It would be perfectly normal to say, “I need the key to start my 
car.”  Strictly speaking, the statement is not true—one could “hot wire” 
it in the way that car thieves do.  But as a practical matter, we regard the 
statement as true because there is such a huge leap from starting a car 
with the key and starting it by identifying the wires to the ignition, 
baring them, and crossing them in the “correct” way. 
Anglo-American criminal law uses the notion of necessity in the same 
practical sense.  When A advances on B with a gun, the criminal law deems 
deadly defensive force “necessary” to prevent B’s death.  Clearly “necessary” 
in this context means something less than “without which the killing 
would certainly occur.”  Any number of events could intervene to prevent 
the killing.  The gun could jam.  A could suffer a heart attack.  A could 
voluntarily desist at the last moment.  It is not 100% certain that, without 
deadly defensive force, A will kill B.  But it is sufficiently close for the 
criminal law. 
As applied to warrantless wiretapping, the necessity requirement will 
shake out this way.  Warrantless wiretapping will always be immoral 
when used in a preemptive, prophylactic manner.  Law enforcement 
may not use warrantless wiretapping as a routine policy on the theory 
that it is likely to save innocent lives at some unspecifiable point in the 
future.  It may only be used when it would substantially enhance the 
chances of preventing an individualized, known threat to innocent human 
life.  Or, to put it differently, the threat must be concrete rather than abstract. 
A hypothetical will illustrate this point.  Suppose that top law 
enforcement officials promulgate a secret policy under which all future 
wiretapping of suspected terrorists or people thought to be associated 
with suspected terrorists will be done without warrants.  Further, suppose 
the sincerely held belief behind the policy is that over the long run 
wiretapping suspected terrorists without warrants will significantly 
enhance the probability of saving innocent lives, compared to a regime 
in which all wiretaps are executed pursuant to warrants.  Is this a 
permissible trade-off? 
I think we want to say no.  The enhanced probability of saving lives in 
this example is too morally attenuated from the infringement of the right 
not to be wiretapped without warrants.  The hypothetical gives rise to no 
specific scenarios in which law enforcement can visualize lives being 
saved by the warrantless nature of the surveillance.  The best that law 
enforcement can say is that somewhere, somehow, in some manner, the 
chances of saving life will be enhanced by not seeking warrants. 
Now why should this lack of specificity matter?  A life is a life; what 
difference does it make how much we know about the precise circumstances 
under which it would be saved?  I do not know the answer to this, except 
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to say that it seems to matter a great deal to our moral intuitions.  To see 
this we need only recur to the criminal law’s treatment of justification.  
The doctrines of necessity, self-defense, and defense of third persons all 
require that the actor reasonably believe in the “imminence” of the 
threat.  One may not use defensive force against another or otherwise 
violate the law in order to preempt a temporally remote threat.  The 
strictness of this imminence requirement has been criticized a good deal, 
largely by those who decry its effect on women who kill their batterers 
while they sleep.29  I side with those who would liberalize the strict 
temporal aspect of this doctrine.  But even if the temporal aspect of 
imminence were liberalized to some degree, it would maintain one 
important moral quality in the law of justification—epistemological clarity.  
The threat needs to be relatively concrete.  We need to have a pretty 
good idea about the evil’s who, what, when, and where.  We are less willing 
to trade off rights (for example, not to be killed or assaulted, or have 
one’s property meddled with) for the sake of epistemologically abstract 
benefits.  The better we can visualize the circumstances under which the 
trade-off might save a life, the stronger the moral tug.  We feel little, if 
any, moral sanction for preemptive trade-offs. 
In the end, I doubt there is a single algorithm that can capture our 
considered moral intuitions about what constitutes a “sufficient increase” 
in the probabilities of saving human life to justify warrantless wiretapping, 
or about what constitutes a sufficiently “concrete” threat.  Wiretapping 
phones without court approval is not nearly as destructive of dignity and 
personhood as murder or torture.  At the same time, the claim against 
such surveillance is clearly more stringent than Thomson’s favorite 
example—kicking an innocent person in the shin—or being taxed an 
extra couple of dollars a year (which might be considered the fiscal 
equivalent of a kick in the shin).  There will be spirited arguments over 
whether warrantless wiretapping was justifiable in a particular case.  I 
have attempted only to establish a framework for the analysis, not to 
settle all such arguments ahead of time. 
 29. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(1), at 78 (1984) 
(“The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the 
response necessary in defense.”); see also Lawrence P. Tiffany & Carl A. Anderson, 
Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DENV. L.J. 839, 846–47 (1975) 
(“[T]emporal ‘imminence’ of the threat may be . . . evidence of a lack of alternatives, but 
the absence of temporal ‘imminence’ is not proof of the existence of alternatives.”). 




Under my general thesis, then, warrantless wiretapping is immoral 
unless operatives reasonably believe it is necessary to save human lives.  
I have now defined necessary as denoting a situation in which the 
surveillance will sufficiently enhance the probabilities of saving human 
life, and where the scenario is sufficiently concrete.  I have further 
acknowledged that there is no bright-line test for identifying “sufficient 
enhancement of probabilities” or “sufficient concreteness” of a threat 
scenario.30  However, I have insisted upon using the word necessary, 
with all its illusion of bright-line quality, to remind us of the stringency 
of the claim not to be wiretapped without warrants, and to encourage the 
impression that these trade-offs are morally suspect.  Only those trade-
offs that have a distinct, if not literal, “last resort” character to them can 
be assured a clean bill of moral health. 
Before proceeding any further, however, I wish to consider two 
objections, one that I take to be quite serious and one less so.  The less 
serious objection is that my thesis rests on an unrealistic premise, 
namely, that we must always choose innocent life over anything else.  In 
fact, runs the objection, we choose all sorts of other values over innocent 
life all the time.  For example, we know that the operation of motor 
vehicles kills thousands of innocent people every year.  Yet we continue 
to sanction their operation because we are not willing to sacrifice the 
massive economic detriment that would result from the banning of motor 
vehicles.  So why can we not say that our right to privacy outweighs 
saving innocent lives in much the way that the health of the economy 
outweighs it? 
This objection confuses what is morally required with what is morally 
permissible.  It is certainly true that we as a society have chosen the 
certainty of thousands of deaths every year from the operation of motor 
vehicles.  I cannot say that this is an immoral choice—I would not say 
that government is morally required to ban all motor vehicles.  But I 
would unequivocally say that government is morally permitted to do so.  
If, miraculously, there developed sufficient political support for banning 
all motor vehicles, it would certainly violate no individual’s moral rights 
for government to prohibit further vehicle operation provided that it was 
done in a procedurally fair way.  By the same token, I argue merely that, 
under certain circumstances, it is morally permissible for government to 
sacrifice the privacy rights of innocent individuals to save innocent lives.  
I do not argue that government is morally required to do so. 
 30. See THOMSON, supra note 19, at 165 (“[A] theory of rights cannot be expected 
to supply a nonvague general formula by means of which it can be decided, quite 
generally, when it is permissible to infringe a claim.”). 
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The more serious objection is this: If we may sometimes engage in 
warrantless wiretapping to save innocent human lives, then what is to 
stop government from trading a few innocent lives to save a larger 
number of innocent lives?  What is to stop government from killing an 
innocent person to harvest his organs and thereby save five or six 
innocent lives? 
I do not have a fully satisfactory response to this objection, simply 
because any such response would require a comprehensive moral theory, 
and I do not have one.  I suppose I could cut the objection short by asserting 
that there is an absolute side constraint against sacrificing innocent 
human lives.  Indeed, I could even extend the side constraint to the torture 
or rape of innocent humans.  The truth is I do not know if such an absolute 
side constraint ought to exist or not.  I cannot say for sure that I would 
think it immoral to sacrifice one innocent person to save ten million 
innocent ones, or that I would be inalterably opposed to torturing one 
innocent person to spare ten million innocent ones unspeakable suffering.  I 
agree with Thomson that saving five or six innocent lives is clearly not 
enough to justify sacrificing one innocent one, but as I have already 
conceded, I do not think it possible to offer an algorithm.31  I will 
content myself by turning the tables on those who would make this 
objection.  If we may never engage in warrantless wiretapping to save 
innocent human lives, then how could it ever be justified for us to kick 
an innocent person in the shin to save other innocent lives?  Or, more to 
the point, how could it ever be justified for us to engage in what I have 
described as the fiscal kick-in-the-shin, taxation?  Until one is prepared 
to offer a comprehensive moral theory that explains why a kick in the 
shin to save innocent lives is justifiable while warrantless wiretapping 
never is, I do not feel compelled to offer a comprehensive moral theory 
to explain whether saving a very large number of innocent lives would ever 
justify sacrificing a very small number, or under what circumstances it 
might be permissible.32 
 31. Id. at 153 (“Perhaps no increment, however large, would make it permissible 
for the surgeon to proceed . . . .  At all events, this increment is not sufficiently large.”). 
 32. Cf. id. at 176–202 (demonstrating the complexity of the explanation for the 
apparent paradox of the “Trolley Problem”). 





What if it turns out that a particular act of warrantless wiretapping was 
not, in fact, necessary to saving innocent life?  That it did nothing at all 
to enhance the chances of saving life, and that in fact no lives were 
saved?  Does that mean the surveillance is per se immoral?  I believe the 
answer is no. 
Again, I would analogize to the justification defenses in criminal law.  
In virtually all jurisdictions today, the availability of a justification 
defense pivots not on the reality of a threat, but on the actor’s reasonable 
perception of a threat.  So long as a reasonable person in the actor’s 
situation would perceive the type of threat that qualifies one for the 
privilege of defensive force, it does not matter that the perception turns 
out to be incorrect.  The reason for this rule is, I believe, a moral one: 
We do not generally ascribe immorality to actors who cause harm 
without fault. 
This moral principle appears most clearly in the law of homicide, 
where the penal stakes are the highest.  If A kills B in the absence of any 
culpability—that is to say, not in any way that A could be faulted—then 
the criminal law authorizes no punishment whatsoever for the killing.  If 
a small child darts out from in front of a parked car and a driver, having 
observed all traffic laws and having done everything he could to avoid 
the child, hits and kills him, the homicide is noncriminal and the driver 
may not be punished.  The criminal law foregoes punishment here for 
the simple reason that it seems unjust to punish under the circumstances.  
Although the concept of justice is not coterminous with morality, they 
are certainly related, and I think it not too much of a stretch to say that 
the average citizen does not feel that the driver has done anything 
immoral in this situation.  Of course, the criminal law foregoes punishment 
for numerous other reasons as well—the absence of deterrent effect, the 
absence of violent propensities in offenders, difficulties in detection and 
apprehension, concerns about horizontal equity, and so on.  Whatever 
else might be said about not punishing the driver in the dart-out case, 
however, I feel confident in saying that the principal reason is that the 
driver does not seem morally responsible for the child’s death.33 
So it is with the use of defensive force, including deadly force.  When 
A approaches B with a gun aimed directly at B’s chest, B is justified in 
shooting A first.  Even if it turns out that A’s gun was a toy, or unloaded, 
 33. In theory, the felony murder rule punishes a killing on the basis of strict liability.  
From a moral standpoint, however, the actor is at fault for committing the underlying 
intentional felony.  That, one imagines, is why the rule continues to be popular. 
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B has a full defense.  It is not that B has not done any harm; he has killed 
someone who in reality was no threat to him whatsoever.  But he has 
done nothing immoral.  The same would be true if, instead of advancing 
on B (an armed person), A advanced on C (an unarmed person).  If B 
were to kill A in this situation, B would be justified in killing A even if it 
turned out that A’s gun was quite incapable of shooting.  B had a reasonable 
perception that there was no other way to protect C’s life from an 
unlawful and deadly attack by A. 
I think it follows that when law enforcement reasonably perceives that 
warrantless wiretapping is necessary to save innocent lives in a concrete 
situation, the wiretapping is not immoral, even if it turns out that there 
was never any threat to the lives in the first place.  I fully acknowledge 
that the reasonable belief of government operatives does not in any way 
erase the harm done to the privacy interests of wiretapped individuals.  
There are, however, three things to bear in mind.  First, the mere fact that an 
act causes harm cannot by itself make the act immoral, as with the child 
dart-out example.  Second, it is not immoral to do an act that one knows 
will cause harm if one has a sufficient moral justification.  Third, even if 
the threat turns out to be real, and the warrantless wiretapping actually 
saves innocent lives, the persons who were wiretapped have suffered 
some harm to their privacy interests, and the fact that lives were saved 
does not erase those harms, but the harms are simply outweighed by the 
lives saved.  If the saving of innocent lives outweighs the harms done to 
privacy interests, then a reasonable perception in the need to engage in 
warrantless wiretapping to save innocent lives also outweighs the harms 
done to privacy interests.  To hold otherwise would be to elevate luck to 
a position of moral primacy. 
There is a different argument against my assertion that reasonable 
belief in the necessity of warrantless wiretapping should be treated the 
same as actual necessity.  This argument focuses on the fact that the 
wiretapping is warrantless.  When government breaks the law, it could be 
argued, it has no moral standing to claim that it was not at fault.  When 
government has gone through proper judicial process, it preserves the 
ability later to argue that it reasonably perceived a threat to human life 
that required immediate action.  If it chooses to forego that process, it 
has deliberately bypassed a second, disinterested pair of eyes that could 
have detected the absence of any true threat.  The government must now 
accept the consequences of its choice. 




The problem with this argument is that the warrantless nature of the 
wiretapping has already been taken into account when deciding whether 
the risk is morally justified.  That is, in order for the conduct to be morally 
justifiable under my thesis, the agents must have reasonably believed 
that, under these circumstances, the warrantless nature of the surveillance is 
essential to the prospect of saving lives.  To hold the agents responsible 
for getting it wrong on the ground that they did not seek a warrant is to 
forget what made the risk worth taking in the first place. 
IV. 
We have reached the last portion of my thesis: Even if the operatives 
do not reasonably believe that the warrantless wiretapping is necessary 
to save innocent lives, the surveillance is not immoral so long as 
operatives hold a reasonable belief that the subjects are guilty and so 
long as the surveillance is reasonably related to an effort to save lives.  
This portion of my thesis effectively recognizes a lower justificatory 
threshold when the subject of the wiretapping is himself guilty.  This 
position is built on a theory of graded moral forfeiture, and I imagine that 
it will provoke disagreement from some advocates of security and from 
some civil libertarians. 
In The Realm of Rights, Judith Jarvis Thomson argued that one does 
not forfeit rights as against other individuals merely by acting culpably.34  
She attempted to demonstrate this point with two hypotheticals.  In the 
first, A and B are in an elevator when A villainously attacks B with intent 
to kill.  B clearly is privileged to employ force in self-defense, including 
deadly force if necessary.  Our impulse—mistaken, Thomson says—is to 
attribute the loss of A’s moral right not to be killed to the fact that A has 
engaged in morally culpable behavior toward B and therefore has 
forfeited that moral right.  In Thomson’s second hypothetical, C suffers a 
spontaneous episode of insanity, causing him to attack D with deadly 
force.  We would all agree that D is privileged to defend himself by 
killing C.  In this situation, C has lost his moral right not to be killed by 
D.  Yet C is not at fault—he is a morally irresponsible agent.  It must be 
some other factor that causes C to lose his right not to be killed.  From 
this, Thomson concludes that A’s loss of the right not to be killed by B 
must be attributable to something other than A’s fault for attacking B in 
the first place. 
Thomson goes on to say that what causes both B and D to gain the 
privilege of killing A and C is need.  But this will not do.  Suppose E 
attacks F in the elevator with intent to kill.  F somehow gains the upper 
 34. THOMSON, supra note 19, at 366–71. 
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hand and is about to kill E, which he reasonably believes is necessary to 
save his own life.  At this point E “needs” to kill F, for there is no other 
way to stop F from killing him.  No one thinks that in this situation E is 
privileged to kill F.  F has not lost his moral right not to be killed.  Need, 
at least by itself, cannot be the decisive factor in who loses his right not 
to be killed, and, correlatively, who gains a right to kill.  But if need is 
not doing all the work, what is doing the rest of it? 
I believe fault is doing some of the work here, diminishing the 
stringency of A’s and C’s moral right not to be killed by B and D, 
respectively.  It is easy to see why A’s aggression diminishes the stringency 
of his right not to be killed by B.  The ultimate question is the degree of 
the diminution, a matter to which I shall return momentarily.  It is much 
more difficult to see why C’s aggression diminishes the stringency of his 
right not to be killed by D, because C’s aggression is the product of 
insanity rather than “free will.”  Yet it is my contention that our response 
to this hypothetical—namely, that D must be privileged to kill C in that 
situation—results in part from perceiving some fault on C’s part.  The 
average person simply does not see insanity as rendering a person 
wholly irresponsible from a moral perspective.  Because an insane adult 
has the same basic outward physical appearance of a sane adult, we are 
hardwired to attribute to that person some minimal ability to see the 
world as we see it and to control his behavior as we can control ours.  
Expert testimony may convince us that an insane killer is delusional, but 
it does not convince us that the person is entirely morally without fault.  
Even putting aside those cynics who believe that all insane killers are 
“faking it,” there is always an epistemological gap with insanity.  How 
can we know for sure that this person, delusions and all, could not have 
made better choices in this situation?  After all, he does not go around 
killing everyone he sees; he must have some residual capacity to reason 
and exercise some self-discipline.  When John Hinckley shot President 
Reagan and was acquitted on grounds of insanity, there was a massive 
popular backlash, leading Congress and many state legislatures to return 
to the restrictive M’Naghten standard of insanity.35  If people really 
perceived insanity as robbing a person of all moral agency, this backlash 
would be inexplicable. 
 35. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 853 (2d ed. 2000) (“[T]wo-
thirds of the states took steps to limit the insanity defense in the three years following the 
Hinckley verdict. . . .  As a result, . . . M’Naghten [became] the prevailing standard in the 
majority of states.”). 
LEE POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC 2/7/2008  2:51:52 PM 
 
740 
As I have demonstrated, need is not doing all the work in all the cases.  
But there are a few cases in which need truly does do all the work.  E, a 
three-year-old child, and F, an unrelated adult, are in an elevator.  E has 
gotten ahold of a loaded gun and is aiming it menacingly at F.  F also 
has a loaded gun and could shoot E dead.  Is F privileged to kill E? 
I think the answer to this for most people will be yes, but not right 
away.  Most people would fight this hypothetical much more doggedly 
than they would fight the insanity hypothetical.  How do we know that E 
really intends to pull the trigger?  Could we not expect a three-year-old 
child to be a pretty bad shot?  Could F not reach over and grab the gun?  
Or at least shoot the gun harmlessly out of E’s little hands?  Of course, 
we can add to the facts to preserve the essential moral dilemma: E has 
already fired one shot, just barely missing F and provoking a giggle 
from the child shooter; it is a large elevator and F is nine feet away from 
E, well out of reach, and so on.  At this point I imagine most people 
would weaken and acknowledge that F is privileged to shoot E, although 
a few might continue to insist that F does not have any such privilege, 
but rather that the hypothetical simply presents a tragic situation where F 
must allow himself to be killed. 
Even if we ultimately would recognize a privilege in F to kill E, my 
point is that we would want to see the most compelling evidence that the 
killing was absolutely indispensable to saving F’s life, because a three-
year-old is clearly not a responsible moral agent.  In the insanity 
hypothetical, we are far less demanding of proof that the killing of C is 
indispensable to saving D’s life.  Suppose D shot C after C lustily announced 
his intention to kill D on account of D being the devil incarnate, but 
before actually raising the gun.  Or suppose D shot C despite some 
evidence that he was within reach of C and might have been able to 
knock the gun from C’s hand.  I doubt that many people would consider 
that D had disqualified himself from the privilege of shooting C on the 
ground that it was not truly necessary under the circumstances.  I believe 
this is because most people do not consider C completely innocent.  The 
less innocent the threat, the less drastic precautions are required before 
eradicating it forcefully. 
This brings us back to the first hypothetical.  To what degree is A’s 
moral right not to be killed by B diminished on account of A’s guilt as a 
terrorism conspirator?  The forfeiture is clearly not total.  Surely B 
would not be justified in killing A after he had laid down his gun, put his 
hands on his head, and surrendered.  But by the same token the forfeiture 
is not zero.  Few would think that B had lost his privilege to kill A 
simply because he did not wait for A to cock the hammer, or because B 
made no attempt to knock the gun out of A’s hands first, or because B 
did not explore the possibility of escaping through a trap door.  If we do 
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not feel that D was required to exhaust every last alternative before 
killing C, we feel even less strongly that B was required to do so before 
killing A.  So long as B did not forego any obvious means of saving his 
life short of killing A, he retains his privilege. 
Because the precise degree of moral forfeiture in this hypothetical is 
elusive, we would be best to couch it in terms of reasonableness.  So 
long as B did not forego any alternative means of defending himself that 
a reasonable person in that situation would have employed, it is not 
immoral for him to kill A.  B is not required to undertake any heroic or 
extraordinary measures to safeguard A’s life in the course of warding off 
A’s attack.  A’s culpable aggression against B has considerably diminished 
the stringency of A’s moral claim not to be killed by B. 
We are now able to return to the question posed at the beginning of 
this part: To what degree have terrorists forfeited their moral right not to 
be wiretapped without warrants?  Again, the degree of the forfeit is not 
total.  Government may not, for example, wiretap terrorists simply to 
satisfy the voyeuristic urges of surveillance agents.  On the other hand, 
the degree of forfeit is more than zero.  From a purely moral standpoint, 
government is not required to obtain warrants to wiretap known terrorists 
when a reasonable person would think that the process of requesting a 
warrant would unreasonably endanger the effort to prevent grave harm.  
A terrorist has no standing to complain that his moral rights have been 
violated because government did not obtain a warrant before wiretapping 
his phone, unless it would have been obvious to a reasonable person that 
obtaining a warrant would not seriously prejudice the surveillance 
mission.  Government is not morally required to make large sacrifices of 
goods or advantage to protect the rights of known terrorists not to have 
their phones tapped without warrants. 
Having said this, a couple of important reminders are in order.  One is 
that this only applies to known terrorists, by which I mean that government 
has a reasonable belief in the terrorist status of the intended wiretapping 
subject.  If operatives lack that reasonable belief at the time they initiate 
the wiretapping and only later stumble onto evidence that the subject is a 
co-conspirator, the wiretapping is immoral.  If A shoots B intending to 
kill for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds, and it only turns 
out later—to A’s complete surprise—that B was about to kill A, A deserves 
punishment for murder.  That the killing would have been justified had A 
known of the basis for the justification is irrelevant to the morality of A’s 
action. 




Second, I have said only that government is not morally required to do 
more than act reasonably when it wiretaps known terrorists without a 
warrant.  Although the moral status of government action is surely an 
important factor in deciding whether to legalize such action, it is not the 
only factor.  A rational legislature—and, secondarily, rational courts—
must consider whether warrantless wiretapping of even known terrorists 
is so corrosive to rule of law values that there ought to be a blanket rule 
against it.  Alas, the subject of the symposium for which this paper was 
written is moral, not legal, rights, and consideration of the latter would 
take twice or three times the space already taken.  Suffice to say that I 
believe there is a more than plausible policy argument in favor of such 
prophylaxis. 
V. 
It has been my thesis that it is not immoral for government to wiretap 
innocent persons without warrants, provided that the operatives 
reasonably believe that such surveillance is necessary to save innocent 
human life; and, furthermore, that government does not act immorally in 
wiretapping known terrorists without warrants, so long as operatives 
reasonably believe the subjects are terrorists, and so long as the surveillance is 
reasonably related to saving lives.  To civil libertarians, this may seem to 
leave entirely too much room for warrantless wiretapping, particularly in 
the hands of the present administration.  Nonetheless, as I have just said, 
there may well be winning arguments from political philosophy or 
policy in favor of banning warrantless wiretapping altogether.  I have 
merely concluded that such a complete ban is not morally required. 
What does my thesis have to say about the temporary legislation 
enacted in August 2007?36  The legislation’s principal feature is that it 
eliminates any warrant requirement for the wiretapping of subjects 
“reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.”37  
Reportedly this provision was a response to the National Security 
Agency (NSA) having difficulty monitoring communications between 
terrorists outside the United States.38  Because such communications 
were routed through the United States, the NSA was required to obtain 
court approval before wiretapping.  Congress clearly believed that warrants 
should not be required before wiretapping calls between terrorists who 
 36. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801, 1803, 1805a, 1805b, 1805c (2007). 
 37. “Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance under section 101(f) shall 
be construed to encompass electronic surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to 
be outside of the United States.”  50 U.S.C.A. § 1805a (2007). 
 38. James Risen, Warrantless Wiretaps Not Used, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 2007, at A14. 
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are both outside the United States.  On its face, however, the legislation 
authorizes warrantless wiretapping of persons outside the United States 
no matter what their status.  One of the parties could be an American—
indeed, both could be Americans.  It is even more troubling that neither 
one of them need be a suspected terrorist.  Under the provision in question, 
so long as the subjects of the wiretapping are outside the United States, 
the wiretapping simply does not count as “electronic surveillance.” 
Clearly this legislation is inconsistent with my thesis.  What makes 
warrantless wiretapping morally acceptable is the imminent necessity of 
saving lives, or the reasonable belief that the subject is a terrorist—not 
the reasonable belief that the subject is outside the United States.  Civil 
libertarians are surely troubled by the prospect that the NSA will be 
engaging in the warrantless wiretapping of Americans overseas, and I 
share that concern.  But my concern goes beyond that.  I highly doubt 
that Americans are the only ones who have moral rights as against the 
United States government not to be wiretapped without warrants.  The 
basic moral problem with warrantless wiretapping is its denigration of 
personhood.  Surely warrantless surveillance denigrates the personhood 
of innocent non-American citizens every bit as much as it denigrates the 
personhood of innocent American citizens.  There may be some kind of 
argument from political philosophy that governments’ fiduciary duties 
are limited to their own citizens, but we are not here talking about some 
kind of fiduciary duty, such as a duty to spend tax revenues on matters 
generally benefiting the nation.  We are talking about a basic moral duty 
not to do harm to others unjustifiably.  I suppose one could argue that 
the justificatory calculus of the United States government should include 
only benefits that would be enjoyed by Americans, and that it should 
exclude burdens that would be suffered only by non-Americans—thus 
making warrantless wiretapping of non-Americans justifiable if any 
advantage, no matter how slight, might inure to Americans—but the 
prospect is too horrible to contemplate.  It would presumably extend to 
the justification of colonizations, enslavements, and even genocides.  
And it would be well for us to remember that American actions leading 
to the demonization of the United States throughout the rest of the world 
entail a burden of considerable dimension. 
Congress, then, should not renew the temporary legislation in its present 
form.  In my view, the government is not morally required to engage in 
any warrantless wiretapping whatsoever.  It is morally permissible for it 
to engage in such surveillance, but only if imminently necessary to save 
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human lives, or if it reasonably believes the subjects to be terrorists and 
the surveillance is not abusive.  Whatever legislation takes the place 
of the present law should, at a minimum, observe these basic moral 
injunctions. 
 
